Electronic Monitoring: The New Form of Punishment

By making use of a technology developed in 1964, the first Electronic Monitoring (EM) device was invented and used in the United States (U.S.) in the year 1983 to monitor offenders who violated their parole (Black & Smith, 2003). Since then, EM has gained widespread popularity within the world’s most well known penal systems such as those in the U.S., United Kingdom (UK), Canada and Australia (Paterson, 2007). These countries predominantly use EM devices for community based sanctions which are based on; restriction, surveillance and most importantly detention of the offenders who are outside the prison walls (Black & Smith, 2003). The purpose of this paper is to elaborate the use of EM devices, and also to detail some of the key rationales and sociological perspectives for the use of this new emerging form of punishment. In structure, this paper will firstly define EM. Secondly, a summary about the use of EM in Australian states will be provided. This will be then followed by briefly stating some rationales behind the use of EM. Before concluding this paper, some sociological perspectives of EM will be discussed to explain this new form of punishment.

EM devices are usually integrated into an anklet or a bracelet that the offender has to wear constantly for the duration of his or her detention period (Button, DeMichele, & Payne, 2009). According to Button et al. (2009), today, EM devices are of two types; one which makes use of Radio Frequencies (RF) and the other which uses the Global Positioning Systems (GPS). The latter is typically used for offenders that have been granted a higher degree of mobility by the justice system and can be used for both active and passive monitoring of the offender (Button et al., 2009). On the other hand, EM devices that utilise RF technology are used for passive monitoring only, and are employed in circumstances where the offender is restricted or has very little discretion over their individual mobility (Button et al., 2009). When considering how EM devices are used, neither of these two types of EM devices are directly used to track the movements of the offender (Snow, 1999). Rather, they are used to detect whether the offender is at the right place at the right time (Snow, 1999). For example, EM is used to determine whether an offender is present in their residence, in contrast to verifying where the offender is currently present (Nellis, 2002). Having said that, EM devices, especially the devices that make use of GPS, intensely help authorities to track down offenders who do not comply with the terms of their detention, house arrest or similar (Black & Smith, 2003; Haverkamp, Mayer, & Lévy, 2004; Nellis, 1991). Moreover, it is important to note that the use of EM devices in conjunction with various community based sanctions is economically more efficient compared to imprisonment, making EM devices more attractive to policy makers in countries like Australia (Bonta, Wallace-Capretta, & Rooney, 2000).

The Commonwealth of Australia makes use of EM devices in three stages of Criminal Justice System (CJS); pre-trial, at sentencing and post prison (Black & Smith, 2003). Although the extent to which EM devices are used varies from state to state, the use of EM can be observed in the majority of states throughout Australia. For instance, whilst South Australia (SA) allows the use of EM while imposing bail conditions, the state of Western Australia (WA) remains the only state that comprehensively uses EM at the pre-trial stage (Black & Smith, 2003). Furthermore, along with Northern Territory (NT), SA and New South Wales (NSW), WA also makes use of EM, generally in conjunction with other forms of community oriented punishments while sentencing the offender (Black & Smith, 2003). On the other hand, the legislation in practice in the state of Queensland (QLD) and Victoria (VIC) allows the use of EM on offenders after they have successfully served their sentence in prisons or alike (Black & Smith, 2003; Mercado & Ogloff, 2007). This use of EM in post-sentence stage can also be observed in other states of Australia such as Australian Capital Territory (ACT), WA and NSW (Black & Smith, 2003). Collectively, it can be suggested that amongst all the states and territories in Australia, WA is the only state that uses EM devices extensively in all three stages of Criminal Justice System mentioned before. This immense implementation of EM tends to be rationalised by its suggested effectiveness in both controlling and reducing the level of crime and at the same time being more economically efficient (Bonta et al., 2000; Paterson, 2007).

Researchers and scholars that take an Actuarial, managerialism viewpoint, usually focus on the economical benefits and the increase in efficiency and effectiveness of the sanctions or punishments (Bull, 2010b). Reduced running costs or cost effectiveness along with its ability to manage the risk imposed for the greater community via net widening and the potential to lengthen the duration of incapacitation, or in some cases selective incapacitation, makes EM ideal for the capitalist oriented societies that exist around the world (Paterson, 2007). Looking at UK as an example, EM was employed in 1999 for home detention curfew (HDC) (Dodgson et al., 2001). This program allowed eligible prisoners to be released into the community for sixty days with EM and was accompanied by random checks by the authorities, to make certain that the offender does not violate any conditions of parole (Dodgson et al., 2001). With only a 5% recall rate, this program was found to be significantly cost effective, showing up to 57% on savings on prison systems alone (Dodgson et al., 2001). Additionally, the study also highlighted a reduction on offender recall rate compared to prior times which employed similar eligibility criteria but with more frequent visits by the authorities to check up on the offender (Dodgson et al., 2001). Prior to implementation of EM, the frequent visits were essential and a primary objective because, unlike EM devices that send location of the offender in real time, there is no alternative way for the authorities to make sure that the offender is around their registered premises (Dodgson et al., 2001; Nellis, 1991; Paterson, 2007). The use of EM devices that removed the need of frequent visits by law enforcement authorities makes it possible for them to have cuts in the budget and at the same time allowing a reduction in the resources invested in HDCs (Paterson, 2007). However, it is important to note that, the data collected in this study from the UK is not a representative sample from the total number of offenders who are eligible for this program (30% of eligible offenders), making it possible to have skewed data involved, especially having an effect on the rate of recall of offenders back to prison system. Also, the approach of UK is more economy oriented (Paterson, 2007), which undermines risk management aspect of managerialism.

Risk management considers minimising the possible risk or threat the offender might bring about to the wider community (Bull, 2010b). Although the use of EM is loosely tied to deterrent and rehabilitation effects on the offender, it primarily depends on the possibility of quick intervention steps taken by the authorities if by any chance; the offender seeks for opportunities to offend (Button et al., 2009). One of the best descriptions of managerialism in relation with risk management can be taken from the idea of panopticon (also known as the disciplinary gaze) by Jeremy Bentham (Clark, 2007). According to his ideas, prisoners or in more general terms, people, will be willing to obey the rules and respect the regulations as long as they believe that there is a watchful eye overseeing their actions (Clark, 2007). Although EM devices are restricted to check on offender’s physical location alone, these devices acting as an informant to law enforcement authorities about their (possible) violation of their restricted mobility (Saulles & Horner, 2011). In this context, EM devices act as the ‘watchful eye’, making the risk imposed by these offenders more manageable and in the hands of the law enforcement authority. Moreover, since EM has this property of restricting the mobility of the offender (Bulman, 2010), incapacitation is also considered rational for support of the use of EM. Even though EM is a form of selective incapacitation in contrast with complete incapacitation as seen in prisons, it is suggested to be an effective alternative to prison systems if coupled with home detention (Saulles & Horner, 2011). For instance, in some Australian states such as VIC, they allow up to 15 years of home detention and EM for convicted sex offenders after they have served their capital punishment (in prisons) (Mercado & Ogloff, 2007). This helps the authorities to manage the risk or to minimise the threat caused by the offender by detaining and restricting their movements from place to place, but for the next 15 years. What happens after that if the ex-offender is not rehabilitated properly? This highlights one of main criticism and drawbacks of taking managerialism based rationales in imposing sentences (Bull, 2010b) such as EM. It addresses the currently present situation and has short term goals with benefits or results to be seen instantly, unlike utilitarian rationales that have more long time goals which is more (and primarily) focused on deterrence, and rehabilitation of the offender (Bull, 2010b). Therefore, having enduring and stable benefits for the society and likewise is in most cases more beneficial for the society compared to managerialism oriented approaches to sanctions.

Looking at the sociological perspectives of using EM of offenders, much of the literature is on Neo-Marxist perspective which has a high emphasis on its economical benefits and its contribution to the new penology systems that focuses on community and efficiency (Paterson, 2007). According to the work of Feeley (2002); Feeley and Simon (1992), in this new form of penology, the execution of punishments and surveillance are largely privatised on the basis of giving a chance for new cost efficient and efficient methods (with new objectives) of punishments to be surfaced, which in turn gives the new ‘promising’ penal system a Neo-Marxist perspective. When EM is looked into through the lens of Neo-Marxism, the likely image would be; the dominant, control class or the higher socioeconomic class using EM for their benefit, either for their own personnel gains, or to have power over the general public (namely, the working and lower class individuals) (Paterson, 2007). Similar to punishments by transportation in 18th century (Bull, 2010a) and the shift towards privatisation of prisons in the early 90’s in the UK (Shefer & Liebling, 2008), the idea of EM is also driven by the notion of private contractors being able to provide same or similar service for lesser cost compared to public authorities (Paterson, 2007). Additionally this reduces the level of responsibility the government has to take if the offender poses a threat to the wider community, because this responsibility now falls on the hands of the private contractor (Paterson, 2007; Shefer & Liebling, 2008). These two reasons, above all, make new forms of punishments such as EM more attractive and beneficial for the governments and also for the private organisations or contractors that work on these projects. Furthermore, it is also suggested that EM enables the higher socioeconomic individuals to be in the comfort of their own wealth and resources if they are to be incarcerated, making it more appealing for the individuals working in the private sector and at the same time being more businesses oriented, like in the UK, rather than punishing the offender being the focus (Paterson, 2007).

Looking at an alternative sociological perspective, Foucault’s views on the shift in Criminal Justice System (CJS) that revolved around revenge and bodily violence, to transforming and managing the risk presented by the offender (Foucault, 1977; Foucault, Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991) could be used to explain the shift in the current CJS (primarily) from prison systems to selective incarceration or EM of offenders. According to Foucault et al. (1991), the main focus of governments is to seek the right and neutral balance between the needs of general population. This (rather new) idea known as governmentality is based on laws and regulations, which authorities makes use of to strive to attain means which are justifiable by its end results (Foucault et al., 1991; Marx, 2011). Therefore, considering the economic benefits and efficiency in risk management, along with the functionality of selective incarceration of the use of EM that was discussed before, it can be suggested that Foucault’s governmentality standpoint is a prime influence in the shift in the use of EM. Additionally, when coupled with Beck’s idea of governmentality which is centred on the effective distribution of government resources to accomplish goals that are oriented towards minimising hazards and maximising security for the population, it is clear that the most fundamental idea of governmentality is based on governments making an unbiased, and right choice for the public (Shearing, 2001). However, as Marx (2011) has mentioned, the extent to which this is achieved is questionable considering the level of discretion provided for governments and the level of influence the higher socioeconomic group has on government’s decisions.

In conclusion, this paper discussed risk and governmentality and Neo-Marxist sociological perspectives of using EM on offenders. This paper also discussed the two aspects of managerialism; economic efficiency and risk management along with the ideas of selective incarceration as the rationales of using EM as a means of punishment. Moreover, at the beginning of the paper, the definition of EM is highlighted and how EM is used in different states of Australia is summarised.

This research paper bring to light the power behind attaining economic efficiency and at the same time, the power bestowed on the higher socioeconomic class on policies that basically run the economies of that particular nation. However, this conclusion is limited due to the unavailability of adequate literature and background for some of key ideas that this research paper is based on. Just like EM itself, managerialism and governmentality are fairly new concepts that need further research and more sophisticated empirical data to arrive into a concrete conclusion.

References

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Year Written: 2012

This is the final paper I wrote for the course: Crime and Punishment, [The University of Queensland 2012].